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F O R Q O T T E N  W A R R iO R S :  A lV IE R iC A N  iN d iA N  
S E R V iC E M E N  iN V iE T N A M
Toim Holivi
During the Second World War, whites in the United States 
were presented with a new image of American Indians to contemplate 
and finally to accept as truth. When the United States entered the war. 
Native Americans seemingly flocked to the enlistment stations and 
draft boards, volunteering for the armed forces in numbers far out of 
proportion to their actual population. The poverty-stricken reservations 
not only provided human resources but donated money and land to 
the crusade against the Axis powers.1
From the outset of the war, the media paid a great deal of 
attention to the American Indian contribution. Popular magazines 
like the Saturday Evening Post Collier’s, New Republic and Reader’s 
Digest reported with a great deal of satisfaction that American Indians 
were not only giving all they had to the war effort but were uniquely 
valuable to the military. Typical of the images conjured up of Indians 
was Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes’ description of American 
Indian “inherited talents” for Collier’s in 1944. According to Ickes, the 
Native American fighting man had:
endurance, rhythm, a feeling for timing, coordination, sense 
perception, and an uncanny ability to get over any sort of 
terrain at night, and, better than all else, an enthusiasm for 
fighting. He takes a rough job and makes a game o f it. Rigors 
o f combat hold no terrors for him: severe discipline and hard 
duties do not deter him.2
Even the motion picture industry, perhaps the most powerful 
medium for creating stereotypes, began subtly to change its image of 
American Indians. Hollywood “horse operas” tended to glorify the 
American expansionist past. Indians, a non-Indian idea in the first 
place, were depicted as barriers to American progress. On the screen, 
Indians raped and pillaged without conscience. But contemporary 
Westerns began to portray, more and more, the “Indian companion” 
character who, just as he had in the war, aided whites in a crusade 
against injustice. War movies exploited this new image of Indians even 
further. Soon the steely-eyed, stoic Indian member of the All- 
American platoon, who was willing to die for his non-Indian comrades.
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became an American cinematic cliche.3
The new stereotypes could only have gratified both the state 
elites and the larger American public. The image of Indians as loyal, 
brave, trustworthy fighters, dedicated to the American cause, boosted 
morale and validated the American sense of mission. To most 
Americans the war was a duel to the death between righteous 
democracy and facist injustice. It was a war to free the people of the 
world from the clutches of totalitarianism. American Indians, in 
throwing themselves so unflinchingly and wholeheartedly into the war 
effort, appeared to be seeking to share in the victory, legitimizing 
themselves as American citizens. Indians had been treated miserably 
but they were committed to the American crusade.
According to one young Columbia River tribal member who 
was quoted in a national magazine, even though his people had been 
treated badly by the United States, Hitler would be much worse: “We 
know that under Nazism we should have no rights at all; we should be 
used as slaves.”4 If an oppressed people such as the Indians sided with 
the United States then logically the American crusade was a just 
cause. Moreover, the media gave the impression that Indians were 
fighting in order to become assimilated into the body politic. Indians 
had been transformed, unlike blacks. Latinos, and Asians, into a 
“safe” (meaning politically reliable) minority.
In marked contrast to the World War 2 media attention given 
to their fathers, American Indians who fought in Vietnam have 
received little or no notice. American Indians, for example, have not 
been included in a single general study of Vietnam veterans. Regarded 
as an “insignificant population,” Indian veterans of Vietnam were only 
accepted as a group worthy of mention after the passage of Senate Bill 
2011, requiring the Veterans Administration: “to carry out a
scientifically-valid study of PTSD. ...among Asian-American, American- 
Indian, Native-Hawaiian, other Native-American Pacific-Islander 
(including American Samoan Native) and Alaska Native Vietnam 
veterans.”5
Despite the differences in media coverage of Indian servicemen 
between the two wars, there is every reason to suspect that Native 
American enlistment rates and numbers of draftees were relatively as 
high—compared to the total United States population—as those 
during World War 2. It has been estimated that over 42,000 American 
Indians served in Vietnam between 1966 and 1973.6 This number is 
more than likely a tribal estimate arrived at by adding together the 
numbers of veterans from each of the different reservations. That 
being the case, the estimate might not include some American Indians 
from urban or non-reservation rural areas, members of tribes that are 
not recognized by the federal government and those people of less than 
one-fourth Indian blood.
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There is, simply put, no way of obtaining a completely accurate 
count of American Indians who served in Vietnam. Enlistment and 
draft contracts of the period contained no “American Indian” racial 
category, and recruiters habitually assigned racial categories to 
individuals rather than asking them to what group they belonged. 
Consequently, Indian veterans report that they were listed as being 
anything from Caucasian to Mongolian to “Other”. It is also very likely 
that a number of the people listed as Hispanic are tribal Native 
Americans. Many Apaches and Navajos and practically all of the 
Pueblos and Tohono O’odam have Spanish surnames.
Even if the number of American Indians in Vietnam is accepted 
to be 42,000 it is exceptionally high. During the Vietnam war the total 
Indian population of the United States was less than one million. 
American Indians thus made up at least 1.4% of all the troops sent to 
Vietnam, while Indians in general never constituted more than 0.6% 
of the total population of the US in the same time period. Approximately 
one out of four eligible Native Americans served, compared to one out 
of 12 in the general American population. In other words, Indians, like 
other minority groups, bore a disproportionate share of the war.7
The explanation for the relatively high numbers of American 
Indian servicemen in Southeast Asia during the war is complex. A  
study of 170 American Indian veterans conducted by Robin LaDue, 
Harold Barse, Frank Montour and myself between 1985 and 1988 
reveals that not only were Indians recruited heavily, but they were 
often very willing to serve. The study group, although fairly small in 
number, was extremely responsive. It was culturally diverse, 
representing 77 tribes or combinations of tribes: Kiowas and
Comanches from the southern plains; Cherokees, Creeks and Seminoles 
from the southern woodlands; Sioux and Blackfeet from the northern
TAblE 1:
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Financial Security 20.6% 29.4% 27.6% 22.4%
To Gain Respect 
from Indian People 35.3% 27.1% 17.6% 20.0%
To gain Acceptance 
by Non-Indians 15.3% 23.5% 25.3% 35.9%
Family Tradition 51.2% 24.1% 11.8% 12.9%
Tribal Tradition 43.5% 31.8% 12.9% 11.8%
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plains; Chippewas, Sac and Fox, and Menominees from the Great 
Lakes; Navajos, Apaches, Tohono O’odam and Hopis from the 
Southwest; Colville, Shoshone from the northwest plateau; Tlinget 
and Haida from the northwest coast; Iroquois from New York, and 
Inuit from Alaska. Most were bom between 1944 and 1952, and all 
entered the military between the ages of 17 and 21. Nearly half of them 
now live in urban areas, but only about one-fourth of them actually 
grew up in large population centers. In other words, they were 
representative of the demographic trends among all Indians of their 
age group. On the whole, their educational levels were high for 
American Indians, but most said that these levels were attained only 
after their military service.
Even though the media focused little attention on Indians 
during the 1960s, Native Americans were heavily recruited by the 
military. To the general public and to military elites, Indians were still 
a “safe” as well as a “martial" race. According to several participants 
in the study, military recruiters constantly emphasized that Indian 
people were natural fighters and military men. Also, American Indians 
were a youthful population, averaging between ages 18 and 22. 
Theoretically, a large portion of the Native American population were 
prime candidates for military service in the first place, and would have 
been recruited and drafted in disproportionate numbers compared to 
other, older groups.
Besides being recruited and conscripted in relatively large 
numbers, Indian males in the 1960s had their own reasons for 
entering the service and specifically for seeing combat in Vietnam. In 
general, American Indians in the United States live on reservations, in 
rural non-reservation areas, or in low-income sections of large 
metropolitan centers. The lack of employment, even during the 
prosperous 1960s, was marked in all three locales. During the period, 
a number of Indian communities in several states were involved in 
confrontations with whites over hunting and fishing rights and land 
and water disputes. Opportunity was nil, education was limited, and 
poverty was rampant. Military service, according to most of the 
Vietnam veterans who took part in the study, offered at least some 
degree of financial reward.
There were, in addition, some cultural and social reasons for 
young Indian males to make the decision to leave their home 
communities. Many traditional Indian communities simply have very 
little room for young males. Older males in these communities 
traditionally control the economic and religious aspects of life, while 
females are often the arbiters of a community’s social arrangement. 
American Indian males between the ages of 18 and 25 are almost 
expected to leave the community for a period of time in order to mature 
and gain outside experience. Some Indian elders believe that this
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situation is a holdover from the times when young men prepared for 
and went off to war. When young Indian males leave their home 
communities there is very little opportunity outside of joining the 
military service.8
Within the last seventy years, a number of tribes have built a 
tradition around service in the United States armed forces. This 
development is ironic to be sure and somewhat complex, but basically 
rooted in individual tribal cultures. Several members of the study 
group stated that they had taken part in tribal ceremonies related to 
warfare. Historically, some tribes had lived under the constant threat 
of attack by enemies and felt that unless the military dimension of life 
was placed in a ritual context, it might well permanently dominate all 
other considerations. Other tribes viewed warfare as a disruption in 
the natural scheme of things—a disruption great enough to cause 
disharmony, sickness and social disintegration. In either case, the 
tribes developed ceremonies to cross over the line from peace to war 
and back again. Warriors were ritually prepared for war and offered 
protective medicine to assure their safe return to the community. In 
addition to the rituals for war, many tribes devised purification 
ceremonies to restore individual warriors, as well as the community, 
to a harmonious state. Unless the returning warriors were purged of 
the trauma of battle, it was felt they might bring back memories of 
conflict to the tribe and seek to perpetuate patterns of behavior 
unacceptable to the community in its ordinary functioning. All these 
ceremonies were thought necessary to maintain a tribe’s continued 
harmonious existence with its environment.9
Despite bureaucratic complaints and government prohibitions, 
many tribes maintained a variety of war-related ceremonies. In 1919, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells expressed his irritation at 
the fact that dances and ceremonies were being conducted among a 
number of tribes for the Indian soldiers who had just returned from the 
trenches in France.10 Ceremonies to honor and purify Indian veterans 
also followed World War 2 and the Korean War, despite the widespread 
(and erroneous) idea that Indian soldiers would refuse to take part in 
“yesterday’s culture.”11 The Sioux held victory ceremonies; Kiowas 
took part in soldier dances; Cherokees were ritually cleansed of the 
taint o f battle by medicine men; and Navajos went through elaborate 
“Enemy Way” ceremonies to restore returning veterans to a harmonious 
place in the community.12
All of these ceremonies help keep intact a tribe’s identity. 
Along with language, a sacred history and the knowledge of a specific 
homeland or holy land, particular ceremonies maintain group cohesion 
and distinction. In short, they keep alive a group’s sense of peoplehood. 
Since most tribal societies in the United States are based on kinship, 
the continuity of family tradition is extremely important. An
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overwhelming maj ority of veterans who took part in the study said that 
they entered the military to retain the respect of their own people and 
to carry on family or tribal traditions. Rather than joining the military 
in an attempt to become part of the American mainstream. Native 
Americans seemed primarily interested in remaining a distinctive 
people. Military service, simply put, is one thing that Indian males do.
Several tribes in the United States—the Kiowas and Comanches, 
the Cheyennes, and to a certain extent the Winnebagos, the Sioux and 
the Chippewas—have syncretized service in the American armed 
forces with their own tribal customs. For these tribes there are certain 
functions that can only be performed by veterans. At pow-wows. for 
example, if a dancer drops an eagle feather, it can only be retrieved by 
a veteran. At some tribal gatherings, veterans are still asked to “count 
coup”, or tell a war story, before any ceremonies can begin.
There is also a certain amount of status to be gained in several 
Indian communities by fighting in a war. Traditionally, most tribes in 
the United States were gerontocracies. That is to say, elderly people 
took leadership roles because of their experience. Age and experience 
were equated, in most cases, with wisdom. Warfare was considered 
a life experience and, in fact, most tribal civil chiefs had good war 
records. War was not necessarily a positive experience but it was one 
that gave the participant a firsthand look at human suffering and 
death. As a Winnebago elder remarked before the performance of a 
veteran’s honor song during a pow-wow in Wisconsin, “We honor our 
veterans for their bravery and because by seeing death on the 
battlefield they truly know the greatness of life."
Once in the military during the Vietnam conflict, American 
Indians typically were assigned to combat military occupational 
specialties (MOS)—infantry, airborne, tanks, artillery, gunships. 
Rangers, combat engineers. It has been demonstrated that recruits 
and inductees from the lower socioeconomic strata were more likely to 
be assigned to the infantry and to actually see combat. Studies made 
since the close of the Vietnam war indicate, in fact, that these men 
were twice as likely to find themselves in combat in Southeast Asia as 
soldiers from either the middle or upper classes.13 Historically, 
Indians were crushed by United States military might, forced to 
abandon many of their religious ceremonies, stripped of numerous 
tribal institutions, and left as one of the poorest economic groups in 
the nation. Low economic and educational levels (some reservations 
have reported unemployment rates as high as 80% and education 
averaging out at the eighth grade level) virtually assured that most 
Indians would be assigned to non-technical combat duties. Indians 
also seemed to have volunteered for combat assignments in relatively 
large numbers. Combat duty appears to have been a mark of 
distinction within several American Indian communities. As one
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Cheyenne veteran remarked: “I’m proud of our warrior status.”
The lack of media attention given to American Indian servicemen 
in Vietnam did not curb or In any way put an end to the old stereotypes 
that had followed World War 2 Indian veterans. The old stereotypes, 
in fact, followed American Indian fighting men into thejungles and rice 
paddies of Vietnam. It became all too clear that many small unit 
commanders were still infected with the “Indian Scout Syndrome”, 
which lasted for the duration of the war. In general, there was an idea 
that Indians were more attuned to nature than their fellow soldiers 
and were thus able to pick up signs of the enemy quickly and easily. 
The stereotype also included a notion that Indians were more stealthy 
and could utilize their senses of sight, smell, touch, and hearing better 
than non-Indians. These notions would seem laughable had they not 
forced Indian troops into some perilous duties. It was typical for 
Indians in Vietnam to be assigned to walk point on patrols and in large- 
scale troop movements.
Troops in Vietnam considered walking point extremely 
dangerous because the point man walked ahead of the main body of 
soldiers. In some units, the assignment was given to a new man who 
was considered expendable. In other units, point became the duty of 
a veteran who not only knew the enemy but the lay of the land. 
Generally, the danger of the position had to do with the topography or 
the flora in an area of operations. If a unit was moving through tall 
elephant grass, for example, the point man could literally walk into a 
concealed enemy position. He would also be in the position most 
vulnerable to booby traps and mines.
A  number of the veterans who took part In the survey stated 
that they walked point more than any other member of their respective 
units. A  Menominee from Wisconsin related that his platoon 
commander thought that since Indians “grew up in the woods" they 
should know how to track and generally “feel” when something in the 
immediate area of operations was disturbed or out of place. “Old 
Snoop and Poop” was the name given to a Cherokee marine who 
seemed to draw the point position more often than not. The phrase 
was used in the Marine Corps to designate a man who was a careful 
and enemy-wise scout. Another veteran, a Navajo from Arizona, 
concurred with the Judgement that Indians had been falsely labelled, 
and stated that it had made the war somewhat more dangerous for him 
personally. He said that he was “stereotyped by the cowboys and 
Indian movies. Nicknamed “Chief” right away. Non-Indians claimed 
Indians could see through trees and hear the unhearable. Bullshit, 
they believed Indians could walk on water.”
Along with walking point, other assignments became fairly 
routine for American Indians in Vietnam. The veterans involved in the 
study were regularly assigned to daytime outposts (OPs) and nighttime
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listening posts (LPs) to take advantage of their supposed natural 
talents. But perhaps the most disturbing and dangerous assignment 
some of the men talked about was being selected as members of “killer 
teams." A  killer team was a small patrol sent into an enemy-controlled 
area to conduct hit and run raids. Sometimes dressed in conical hats 
and Vietnamese clothing, killer teams were utilized tactically to harass 
enemy sympathizers and to disrupt enemy troop movements. The 
teams were exposed to several dangers, not the least of which was 
being sighted and attacked by an American or a South Vietnamese 
unit.
The composition of killer teams was frequently based on race. 
In order to penetrate enemy territory, the killer team was supposed to 
“look” Vietnamese. The selection of individuals for the teams narrowed, 
according to several veterans, to Indians, dark-skinned Latinos, 
Asian-Americans, Pacific Islanders and lighter-skinned blacks. 
(Ironically, enemy-controlled areas, where the killer teams worked, 
were more often than not referred to as Indian Country, in obvious 
mimicry of the old Cavalry versus Indian films.)
American Indians performed other duties while in Vietnam. 
Some were truck drivers, clerks, and supply personnel. But their 
numbers appear to be comparatively very small considering the fact
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that in all modem armies logistics and support personnel always 
outnumber combat troops. The following table shows the units that 
Indian veterans who took part in the survey had served in while in 
Southeast Asia.
Because of their duties and apparently high rate of infantry 
service, American Indians garnered a number of combat decorations 
and also suffered considerable casualties. The 170 members of the 
study group, for example, were awarded 38 decorations for personal 
valor. The physical cost was high, for over 30% of them were wounded 
in action. For the same reasons that hamper the efforts to gain an 
accurate count of American Indian servicemen in Vietnam, the 
number of Indians killed in action in Southeast Asia may never be 
known with certainty.
The emotional trauma of combat in Vietnam was as great as 
the physical cost. Stressful combat experiences were compounded by 
a general dissatisfaction with United States Indian policies. Native 
American soldiers found themselves in the ambiguous position of 
fighting a white man’s war while the whites themselves suffered little, 
and at the same time white men carried out policies designed to 
disrupt tribal cultures and remove rights that the tribes had historically 
possessed. Said one veteran: “The white dudes stayed in school, you 
know, and we fought the war. They don’t know nothing about 
anything except what they get out of a book. But they get the jobs...” 
A  number of the veterans surveyed j  oined Indian political organizations 
such as the American Indian Movement and the National Indian Youth 
Council after their periods of service and took part in protests against 
federal policies and local racism directed at Indian people.
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•Criteria used: Wounded in action, number of days in combat, close contact with 
enemy, seeing battle deaths, actually returning fire, etc.
Even while they were in Vietnam several of the veterans realized that 
the federal government’s wartime policies conflicted with their own 
cultural training and notions of j  ustice. One man was made painfully 
aware o f the differences between his own tribal culture and military 
tactics:
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We went into a ville one day after an air strike. The first body 
I saw in Nam was a little kid. He was burnt up—napalm—and 
his arms were kind o f curled up. He was on his back but his 
arms were curled but sticking up in the air, stiff. Made me 
sick. It turned me around. See, in our way we’re not 
supposed to kill women and children in battle. The old people 
say it’s bad medicine and killing women and children doesn’t 
prove that you're brave. It’s just the opposite.
Another veteran saw striking similarities in the condition of the 
Vietnamese peasants and his own people “back in the World" [the US]:
We went into their country and killed them and took land that 
wasn’tours. Just like what the whites did to us. Ihelpedload 
upvilleaftervilleand pack it off to the resettlement area. Just 
like when they moved us to the rez [reservation]. We 
shouldn’t have done that. Browns against browns. That 
screwed me up, you know.
Still another veteran was forced to take a hard look at the racial 
aspects of the war. During a search and destroy mission, this 
particular man was approached by one of the Vietnamese whose home 
had just been burned to the ground. The old farmer looked at the 
Indian soldier, compared their skin and hair color and said, as if 
confused, “You...me, same-same.”
For a significant number of Indian veterans the return to the 
United States was not what they had expected. If they sought 
acceptance by the whites they were disappointed. If they had thought 
that service in the military would bring them opportunity.they 
discovered that it had only lowered their status within the American 
mainstream. It seemed as if American society, of which they were only 
a peripheral member, had sent them to war and then rej ected them for 
actually serving. One man described his arrival back in the World with 
a great deal of bitterness: “We fought a white man’s war, you know, 
and the first thing that happens when I get back is that some white kid, 
a girl, at the LA airport spits on me.”
Given their combat experiences and their lack of acceptance by 
the general public, it is understandable that fully 80% of the veterans 
in the study admitted that after returning home they suffered from one 
or more of the symptoms associated with post traumatic stress and 
post traumatic stress disorder. Generally, the symptoms include 
frequent inexplicable headaches, flashbacks, depression, severe 
alienation, sleep intrusions, extreme nervousness, and a heightened 
startle response. The disorder is often manifested in antisocial 
behavior, chemical abuse, chronic unemployment, or the inability to 
maintain close personal relationships with friends or family members.14
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TaM e 4:
A merican IncHan V ietnam Veterans. PTSD Sym ptom s  by 96.
Severe Mild None
Depression 36.5% 43.5% 20.0%
Sleep Intrusions 33.5% 42.9% 23.5%
Flashbacks 20.0% 43.5% 26.5%
Rage 38.8% 32.4% 28.8%
Despite their problems, few American Indians seem to seek 
help from the government. The Veterans Administration Advisory 
Committee on Native American Veterans (formed in 1987) found that 
Indian veterans underutilize VA benefits and health care services and 
cite several reasons:
Underutilization is related to several geographic factors such 
as distance and topography: unavailability o f resources 
including transportation: cultural values: eligibility for Indian 
Health Service Programs; and the lack of coordination among 
federal agencies, especially between the Veterans 
Administration and the Indian Health Service.15
On the other hand, a number of the veterans have sought and 
found relief in their own tribal ceremonies. According to a Navajo 
veteran: “When I got back I had a lot of trouble. My mother even called 
in one of our medicine men. It cost them but my folks had an “Enemy 
Way” done for me. It's a pretty big thing.... It snapped me out of it.” 
In the same vein, a Kiowa veteran related:
My people honored me as a warrior. We had a feast and my 
parents and grandparents thanked everyone who prayed for 
my safe return. We had a “special" and I remembered as we 
circled the drum I got a feeling o f pride. I felt good inside 
because that’s the way the Kiowa people tell you that you've 
done well.
Increasingly, Indians who fought in Vietnam have begun to seek 
support and healing among their own people.
Since the end of the Vietnam war, some attention has been 
focused on the representation of minority or ethnic personnel in 
national military services. One of the most insightful studies of 
minority-to-military relationships can be found in Cynthia H. Enloe’s 
Ethnic Soldiers (1980). As part of a larger hypothesis, she suggests 
that militaries not only provide security for the horizontal nation 
against foreign enemies but are the protectors of hierarchical state 
institutions. Enloe demonstrates that state elites—those in control of 
the autonomous structure of public authority—normally have a clear
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idea of “what pattern of interethnic relations best insures the state’s 
survival.” 16 These elites do not ignore ethnic patterns, nor do they 
work to ensure that the military service reflects the nation’s ethnic 
mix. Rather, these elites judge the political reliability and military 
competence of different groups and assign minority troops to military 
occupations according to these criteria, thus assuring that politically 
unreliable groups are strictly controlled or unarmed.
State elites would prefer to arm minorities who have a propensity 
for soldiering and are politically safe. But recruiting even safe 
minorities for military service is a double-edged sword. Though it 
saves the elite from having to expend its own sons in a war, there is 
always the risk that the safe minority will figure out that it is being 
taken advantage of, and begin to turn the guns around (as did a 
number of black soldiers in Vietnam).17 Additionally, such employment 
of ethnic forces puts the elite under a moral obligation to the minority 
group that suffered on the battlefield. In some cases the state 
recognizes the obligation, in others, it does not.
During the Vietnam era, American Indians were considered 
politically safe. For well over forty years they have been stereotyped 
as tenacious, well-disciplined, stealthy, courageous, and knowledgeable 
fighters. The Indian population has been relatively small and remained 
politically quiet until the late 1960s. In fact, between the early years 
of this century and the adoption of more militant political tactics—the 
fish-ins in Washington state (1965-1967), the occupation of Alcatraz 
(1969), the takeover ofthe Bureau oflndianAffairs in Washington, DC 
(1972), and the occupation ofWounded Knee, South Dakota (1973)— 
Indians typically worked within the structure of the state (bringing 
court cases, lobbying, etc.) to redress their grievances. In addition, 
Indians had not yet adopted a supratribal political organization willing 
to rattle the Status Quo until the formation of groups like the National 
Indian Youth Council and the American Indian Movement. The federal 
government, in turn, simply focused attention on tribal governments 
and worked to create and image of the supratribal groups as being 
non-tribal and, therefore, non-Indian. By the time Indian activism 
reached its zenith, the war was already winding down. The late start 
of Indian activism and the rather easy way the federal government 
successfully applied divide-and-rule tactics to suppress supratribal 
militancy made sure that Indians continued to be a relatively safe 
political group.
The American state apparatus has recognized an obligation to 
Indian veterans, but only to a degree. Indian veterans are eligible for 
benefits, but as the recently formed Indian Advisory Committee to the 
Veterans Administration has pointed out, these benefits and services 
have not been utilized to any great extent. In a larger sense as well, 
the state obligation to Indians in general has yet to be fulfilled. The
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American Indians who fought and died in Southeast Asia have been 
neglected and all but forgotten by the state they served.
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